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Abstract 
Affordances provide a useful frame for understanding how users interact with 
devices, but applications of the term to digital devices must take into account 
that human agents operate within a material environment that is distinct from 
the digital environment in which these devices operate. A more restrictive 
approach to affordances would focus on the agency of digital devices distinct 
from the agency of human users. Location-aware mobile devices provide a 
particularly compelling example of the complex interplay of agents and agencies, 
and how “augmented affordances” give rise to a lived space of information for 
human users. 
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The near-ubiquity of ubiquitous computing and mobile devices foregrounds the degree 
to which our everyday lives now involve data. This foregrounding shifts our 
relationship to our lived environment by embedding experience within a framework 
of digital interaction – not only making the world “clickable,” as Wise (2014) suggests, 
but likewise making information space inhabitable. We no longer need to imagine our 
computers as vehicles designed to transport us to and through cyberspace; today, 
cyberspace is all around us – an information overlay mapped onto our everyday 
experience of place. As William Gibson (2011) himself has noted, reflecting on the 
term he coined in 1982: “cyberspace is everywhere now, having everted and colonized 
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the world. It starts to sound kind of ridiculous to speak of cyberspace as being 
somewhere else.” As Jones (2014) notes, “the timeline of eversion” may well begin 
with the first appearance of smartphones in 2006 and 2007, which took computing off 
of our desktops and placed it into our hands (22). 1  Once these devices become 
location-aware, the process of eversion is complete; cyberspace is indeed everywhere.  
The potential for location-aware mobile devices to bring the computational and 
networking powers of computers off the desktop and on the move simultaneously 
alters our sense of place and our experience of the place of information in everyday 
life. As such, these devices provide a particularly literal instance of understanding our 
environmental relation to both information and information technologies, to the 
extent that these devices locate us in a space that is simultaneously embodied and 
informatic. From McLuhan (1994) onward, an ecological approach to media has 
asserted that the medium mattered – and more so, that its materiality mattered. This 
ecological approach to media acknowledges that “the overall human environment 
includes and incorporates technological extensions, and these are never merely add-
ons. They alter our sensibilities and capacities, our notions of self and other, our 
notions of privacy and propriety, and our orientations in space and time” (Anton, 
2016: 131). It is within this ecological context that an examination of digital 
affordances can help us better understand the impact of mobile devices on our lived 
relation with information, as well as our embodied experience of space and place in an 
age of mobile computing.  
J.J. Gibson (1979) developed the concept of affordance to help explain an organism’s 
embeddedness within its environment, arguing that what an animal perceives depends 
upon a kind of coupling between organism and environment based upon that 
particular animal’s potential for action within that particular environment. This 
ecological approach to perception offers an understanding of how agents make use of 
their environments, and the sorts of interactions that give rise to ways of not only using 
the environment, but also embodying space through use. As such, affordances are 
“equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior” (Gibson, 1979: 129). 
Affordances are invariant to the extent that it is not the will or desire of the organism 
that brings forth the affordance, but rather this structural coupling between an 
organism’s potential for action and its environment (Gibson, 1979: 138-139). These 
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invariants communicate a specific set of relations between actor and world such that, 
in Gibson’s (1979) words, “to perceive the world is to coperceive oneself” (141).  
Gibson’s concept of affordances has been applied in a wide range of contexts; some 
recent reviews of the literature have attempted to reframe the concept within a more 
narrow band of applications, for example by modifying exactly which affordances 
these applications attempt to address (Parchoma, 2014; Osiurak, Rosetti and Badets, 
2017; Bucher and Helmond, 2017). In their comprehensive discussion of social media 
affordances, Bucher and Helmond note: “While all conceptualizations of affordances 
take Gibson’s original framing of the term as a starting point, they differ in terms of 
where and when they see affordances materializing (i.e. features, artefacts, social 
structures) and what affordances are supposed to activate or limit (i.e. particular 
communicative practices, sociality, publics, perception)” (240). In thinking through 
human interactions with location-aware devices, which in turn interact with and 
determine a user’s sense of place, we might want to begin by following Bucher and 
Helmond in their distinction between “high-level affordances” which “locat[e] 
affordances in the relation between a body and its environment,” and “low-level 
affordances” that “locat[e] affordances in the technical features of the user interface” 
(240).  
According to this perspective, Norman’s (2013) discussion of affordances would have 
to be categorized as “low-level,” and, at least from the standpoint of object design, it 
is certainly accurate to observe that Norman’s definition offers an adequate 
explanatory framework for describing users’ bodily interactions with location-aware 
mobile devices. However, it is worth noting the degree to which Norman maintains 
an ecological understanding of human interaction with objects, insisting on a 
“relational definition” of affordances as “jointly determined by the qualities of the 
object and the abilities of the agent that is interacting” (11). For Norman, an affordance 
is “a relationship between the properties of an object and the capabilities of the agent 
that determine just how the object could possibly be used” (2013: 11). This relational 
definition sets up a kind of “discoverable,” communicative system between object and 
agent, a “mapping” that first must be realized before it can be actualized (20-23). And 
while Bucher and Helmond are correct in noting Norman’s greater attention to user 
interfaces, Norman also introduces an important distinction between affordances, 
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which “determine what actions are possible,” and signifiers,2 which “communicate 
where the action should take place” (14). A lever affords pushing. Visual cues in the 
form of arrows signify that the agent can push the lever in two directions. Mapping 
discovers and communicates a relation between the spatial orientation of those two 
directions and the motion of the object it controls – for example, a projection screen 
in a lecture hall.3 Or, to apply this idea to a familiar interaction on a location-aware 
mobile device: the screen on my smartphone affords touch, and each app icon serves 
as a signifier in both Norman’s sense and in a semiotic sense, identifying each 
application while at the same time indicating where on the screen to touch. When I 
tap on the Google Maps icon, for example, the app ‘zooms’ out from its particular 
location on my home screen to fill the entire screen, providing me with a map of my 
current location – but also providing me with a conceptual mapping of my interaction 
with the device: touching = opening.  
But as we move from describing my interactions with the object in my hand to my 
experience of the information that this object provides, use of the term ‘affordance’ 
becomes more complicated, to the extent that embodied interaction with these devices 
occurs at a level that is fundamentally distinct from the level at which algorithmic and 
the computational actions occur. As Bucher and Helmond suggest, our interactions 
with digital devices, software platforms, and networks of information require a “multi-
layered approach” that can adequately address our material and social interactions with 
technology, and the relation between the two (2017: 242). As Bucher and Helmond 
note: “the term ‘technology affordances’ establishes material qualities of technology as 
(partly) constitutive of sociality and communicative actions” (237). Along similar lines, 
Hutchby (2001) highlights the importance of focusing on “the material substratum 
which underpins the very possibility of different courses of action in relation to an 
artefact” (450). How, though, do we account for a material substratum that is, in fact, 
digital – and with which human agents do not have any direct interaction?  
While mobile devices have properties (as objects) that afford human users a range of 
potential actions, they likewise possess a range of digital capabilities (as agents) that act 
upon a digital environment. In contrast to user interaction, which remains embedded 
within a material environment, the device itself acts upon a digital environment 
through a distinct set of affordances, including: the execution of protocols, database 
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queries and retrieval, data processing, input/output functions, and network 
transmission. This digital substratum impacts the different ways in which a user can 
engage a device, yet the data-device coupling that gives rise to algorithmic and 
computational action does not afford human users the capacity to act directly upon a 
digital environment. As the device acts upon and within a digital environment, 
however, it materializes and actualizes opportunities for user (inter)action that do 
indeed allow users to coperceive themselves within an inhabitable space of 
information. The material environment and what it affords does not change, but my 
conceptual mapping of what the environment affords changes by way of this 
information overlay, as does my sense of how I might actualize a potential set of 
actions. If we understand affordances, as Hutchby (2001) defines the term, as 
“functional and relational aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities 
of agentic action in relation to an object” (444), we might consider the device itself as 
the agent that engages the digital, which in turn materializes on its screen a new set of 
functional and relational framings for human agents. The human-digital interface, 
then, would map a doubly-mediated coupling of affordances, a relationship that draws 
forth the possibilities of the digital into a range of possible human uses and actions.  
I am thus proposing an environment-specific, actor-oriented account of “low-level 
affordances,” an approach in line with Osiurak, Rosetti and Badets (2017) who, in their 
study of tool use, attempt to restrict as much as possible the definition of the term to 
Gibson’s “animal-relative properties of the environment” (406). In contrasting an 
allocentric (or tool-centric) account of tool-object coupling with an egocentric (or 
hand-centric) account of hand-tool coupling, they conclude that the term affordance 
applies only to the potential for action mapped by way of a hand-tool relation. In short: 
“an affordance exists because of the existence of a potential physical interaction 
between an animal and the environment. They correspond to action possibilities 
resulting from animal-relative, biomechanical properties” (Osiurak, Rosetti and 
Badets, 2017: 409). From this perspective, affordances cannot be contextually 
determined through object-centered relationships. To use their example: a shoe and a 
hammer offer similar affordances to a human agent capable of grasping and striking a 
nail; affordances thus describe a relation between agent and object, even though 
hammers and nails exist within a contextual and designed relationship that shoes and 
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nails do not share (Osiurak, Rosetti and Badets, 2017: 411). But unlike a hammer, the 
smartphone is indeed a “tool” with its own agency and potential for action within a 
digital environment. In this context, then, we may well need to consider a device-
centric application of the term digital affordance, one defined not in terms of 
biomechanical relations, but rather as an algorithmic, protocological relationship to a 
digital environment that maps an intention-independent framework for potential 
action, namely: data input, output, storage, retrieval, and manipulation/computation. 
In this regard, Latour’s (2005) actor network theory (ANT) provides a useful starting 
framework for understanding the complexity of agent-specific affordances,4 actions, 
and interactions within these ecological systems, as well as how human and non-human 
agents map affordances of place. As Parchoma (2014) notes, “within an ANT frame, 
technological affordances can be examined for their enabling, restricting, and 
regulatory roles, emerging from the networked effects of temporal relations among 
physical-social, material-cultural, and human-technical phenomena” (367). This 
framework would suggest not only a complex relationship between human and non-
human agents, but also an ecological understanding of how digital devices serve as an 
extension of the human, and how the human likewise functions as a material extension 
for the digital device. This framework also allows for what Best (2009) describes as 
“relational affordances,” in which device and human alike “inscribe” each other as 
agents within a set of interactive dispositions, within a complex, interactive system 
(402). Drawing upon Latour’s concept of devices as “technical actors” (Johnson, 
1988), Best describes how extension/embodiment is experienced by the user as a 
change in potential action, one that “enables [the user] to act on the world – do 
something to it – rather than just live in it” (405). We may likewise describe location-
aware mobile devices as digital agents oriented toward acting upon a “world” of data 
that is “coupled” with embodied space by way of “place,” much in the same way that 
human agency gains access to an augmented sense of place by way of the information 
overlay materialized by these devices. This process is akin to what Latour (writing as 
Jim Johnson) refers to as a translation of “scripts” between actors and their delegates, 
human and nonhuman alike (Johnson [Latour], 1988: 308). At this point of double 
coupling and double articulation, material and digital agents alike embed their actions 
within this scene of material-informatic translation.  
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Mobile devices offer this sort of “double coupling” between user and environment 
most notably, perhaps, through their location-aware properties – a double articulation 
that materializes and makes visible place-specific information as a frame for human 
agency. For location-aware mobile devices and their human users, “place” provides a 
particularly rich nexus for this exchange. The body-centric and data-centric 
affordances that describe my doubly articulated relation with digital and material 
environments make clear how affordances operate within a network of agents, and the 
transformative impact of this complex media ecology on the spaces of everyday life. 
Our sense of place – and the affordances of place – change because we have more 
access to information about that place. Physical space, and what it affords, remains 
unchanged; at the same time, I now find myself embodied within an inhabitable 
information space. I open Google Maps and a blue dot appears on the screen, pulsing 
at a rate of about 20 beats per minute – somewhat faster than a resting respiration rate, 
and about half as fast as a resting heart rate. The pulsing signifies a “live” signal, 
providing user feedback on the status of the system5 as well as their own status as a 
data point located within the data set that is communicating within a GPS network: a 
real-time presence, both on the screen and in the world. A shaded area, which pulses 
at the same rate, signifies directionality – my heading. Moving the device creates a 
conceptual mapping between my embodied directionality and my orientation on the 
map. My body provides two different sets of interactions with the device. By touching 
the screen, I can alter my relation to the image, but my touch does not alter the location 
of the blue dot indicating my position. Only by altering my body’s location and 
orientation in lived space can I change the location of the blue dot on the screen. In 
effect, I am bi-located: co-perceiving myself simultaneously in the information space 
on the screen and in the embodied space of the material world.  
Place, then, offers a mapping of potential action onto environment for two distinct 
agents – one human and one digital. Place-as-information affords algorithmic 
processing for the location-aware device-as-agent, but in doing so, the device creates 
a material environment for human agency within a lived space of information. When 
using a map application such as Google Maps, the map positions me in a set of 
relations that are both informatic and materially embodied. I see myself in a spatial 
relation to the world around me, and I understand the world around me by way of this 
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information overlay – the names of streets, the location of rivers, public monuments 
and private businesses, etc. Likewise, my wayfinding is dictated by my body’s 
interaction with the world and the corresponding translation of these actions as data 
input for my device, which is then acted upon by the device to produce a 
representation of position on a dynamically changing map upon the screen of my 
smartphone. My body couples with both device and physical space, creating a complex 
mapping that materializes affordances of place that did not exist for me in the physical 
world, but which are now articulated through the actions of a digital agent. The device 
alters our wayfinding – and therefore our sense of place – through this actualization 
of information, producing not an “augmented reality,” but rather a set of augmented 
affordances by way of this double coupling of agents and agencies. 
Affordances as relational couplings, then, mark points of articulation in a material-
digital assemblage. The potential for action thus points in two directions: the 
algorithmic, acting upon data that is derived from material, embodied action; and the 
embodied, acting upon a material environment that is, in turn, informed by algorithmic 
processing. Following Rutz (2016), we might think of this point of double coupling as 
a site of “mutual incursion” – a Deleuzean assemblage marked by “exchange and 
assimilation processes between human and machine” (74). “Algorithmic agency,” then, 
would operate in two (or more) directions – as the artist (as in Rutz’s example) engages 
in “trajectories” of data processes derived by algorithmic action at the same time that 
the algorithm engages in material processes derived by the embodied action of the 
artist and/or audience (Rutz, 2016: 76-80). This emphasis on the interrelationality of 
artist/experimenter and algorithm in machinic assemblages calls attention to how 
“both sides engage in boundary operations that are best described as reconfiguration, 
operations where many elements and relations, representations and concepts remain 
intact but a few critically change” (Rutz, 2016: 82). 
In this sense, each agent (material or digital) operates at a point of incursion in a 
material-digital assemblage. Each acts upon an environment within its own relational 
structure of potential actions, but each also marks “boundary operations” in the form 
of a doubly articulated agency. This same analytical framework would hold for both 
“low-level” as well as “high-level” understandings of affordances, which must still 
come to terms with this boundary event between two or more agents engaged in 
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relational couplings across material and digital environments. Van Dijck (2013) in part 
addresses this issue through a discussion of “user agency,” which maps a complex 
relation between algorithms, protocols, interfaces, and human interaction. This 
complexity plays out, he notes, in the blurred boundary, for example, between “human 
connectedness” and “automated connectivity” of how user agency engages “the 
social” in social media (11-12). In a similar move, Bucher (2012) discusses Facebook’s 
“algorithmic friendship” as “a relation between multiple actors, not only human 
individuals, but also nonhuman software actors” (480). Combining Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblage with Latour’s (2005) actor network theory, 
Bucher argues that “friendship” on Facebook is expressed as an assemblage of both 
human and non-human actors, articulated in moments such as when the platform 
assists the end user in importing contact lists into Facebook (482). Likewise, since the 
algorithms that rank News Feed content determine which friend relations are, in effect, 
rewarded with attention and hence reinforced, these digital acts function in a way that 
determines future friendship interactions (484). Bucher concludes: “Friendships online 
thus need to be understood as a socio-technical hybrid, a gathering of heterogeneous 
elements that include both humans and non-humans … Thinking of friendship as an 
assemblage – a relational process of composition – offer[s] a way to critically scrutinize 
how software participates in creating initiating, maintaining, shaping, and ordering the 
nature of connections between users and their networks” (Bucher, 2012: 489). 
We can extend Bucher’s discussion of “programmed sociality” to an account of 
programmed spatiality, in which the production of space involves both human and 
nonhuman actors. Place-as-data/data-as-place marks a double articulation, a boundary 
operation in two directions: the digital action of digital agents is dependent upon 
materially embodied human agents, who in turn act upon an embodied environment 
in ways that are equally dependent upon the digital action of digital agents. As Gibson 
himself notes in a discussion of “places and hiding places,” what an environment 
affords to an actor is not without the influence of “place learning” and “social 
perception” (136). In this instance, however, place learning and social perception occur 
through a “relational process of composition” across two environments (digital and 
embodied) and a multitude of actors. Embodied actors engage a programmed and 
material environment articulated not only by the algorithmic agency of a data-driven, 
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human-device coupling, but also by way of incursions in the other direction, as 
multiple human agents translate their lived experience of place into data that will, in 
turn, make information space inhabitable. 
While Bucher and Helmond (2017) question the degree to which Gibson’s concept of 
invariant affordances would apply to the “increasingly dynamic and malleable nature 
of [social media] platforms,” an environment-specific, actor-centric account of 
affordances and agent-enabled action would, in fact, acknowledge how agent-action 
coupling plays itself out in invariant ways within material and digital environments for 
different sets of interdependent agents, distinct from variable features of interface 
design (248). By way of contrast: Karahanna et al. (2018) distinguish features from 
affordances by claiming that features “enable” an application’s affordances.6 Thus, 
they claim: “social media offer the affordance to connect with others, enabled by, for 
example, features such as ‘friending’ on Facebook and ‘following’ on Twitter” 
(Karahanna et al., 2018: 739). In their attempt to generate a comprehensive taxonomy 
of social media affordances, Karahanna et al. identify three egocentric affordances – 
self-presentation, content sharing, and interactivity – along with four allocentric 
affordances – presence signaling, relationship formation, group management, and 
browsing others’ content (744-745). In an environment-specific, actor-centric account 
of affordances, however, “self-presentation” and “content sharing” of a human agent 
would collapse into a single affordance: the potential to respond to a prompt. Signifiers 
for these prompts vary by feature – they are indicated by way of icons and 
photographic images, but also by text marked in bold, underlined and/or alternate 
color. Features signify, and thereby structure by design the user’s conceptual mapping 
of affordance to action. Anyone who has double-tapped on a Facebook photo in an 
attempt to “like” the image has experienced the degree to which features of response 
vary across applications, but this error is at the same time indicative of the invariant 
affordance that both Facebook and Instagram present: the potential to respond to 
output on the screen. As a potential for action, “providing input” offers a set of 
affordances that is distinct from “response,” one that again maps in feature-specific 
ways (Instagram’s “+” icon at the bottom of the screen vs. Facebook’s prompt 
“What’s on your mind?” at the top of the screen). Note that while embodied actions 
of the user may appear similar in both instances (tapping on a screen), the environment 
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differs considerably: in one instance, I am responding to the device’s output of content, 
while in the other, I am responding to a request for input from the application itself. 
In addition to “responding to a prompt” and “providing input,” we might add to this 
tentative list of affordances “tracking,” or what Schrock (2015) identifies as 
locatability,7 to the extent that the device provides me with a representation of my own 
location as both input and output, prompting me to various actions and engagements. 
While not meant to provide an exhaustive list, these examples of an actor-centric 
approach to affordances suggest a way of mapping invariant potential action within 
material and digital environments for human and digital agents alike, as well as 
accounting for complex interactions between agents and agencies.  
If features map affordances for human agents acting on and within an inhabitable 
information space, they likewise provide a mapping for digital agents acting upon the 
human user as a material extension of their potential for digital action. This insight 
aligns with Bucher and Helmond’s (2017) insistence on “the multi-directionality of 
agency and connectivity” and “a socio-technical sensibility towards the distributed 
agency of humans and nonhumans” (249).Vaast et al. (2017), for example, argue that 
“connective affordances” emerge through social media use as a result of “mutually 
dependent yet distinct patterns of feature use among emerging roles … What is 
afforded to one role depends upon how other roles use the technology” (1199). I 
would suggest that these same features-mapped connective affordances are likewise 
providing a mapping for digital agents as they make use of human agents as networked 
human actors, extending their digital agency into an embodied space, much as mobile 
devices extend human action into a digital realm. When human agents create data 
through embodied action, those data sets then provide a basis for algorithmic action 
by a digital agent. The materialization of this action as output on a smartphone screen 
provides an articulation from one layer to another, giving rise to a boundary operation 
between immaterial information and the embodied environment of the human agent 
about to act upon this information.  
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Figure 1: Google Maps screen capture. Map data: Google, copyright 2019. Photo: Mark Nunes 
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This account of environment-specific action and boundary operations aligns well with 
Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological account of agency (Ihde, 2002; 2009; 2011). Ihde 
(2011) suggests an “inter-relational ontology” to understand how “human-technology 
relations” can be understood as a “mutual co-constitutional process” (18). Ihde (2002) 
notes that “in this interconnection of embodied being and environing world, what 
happens in the interface is what is important” (87). This “area of interaction or 
performance” marks a “symbiosis of humans plus their artefacts in actional situations” 
(Ihde, 2002: 92-93). This “hybrid agency” occurs in multiple human-technology 
relations, but is particularly notable when humans find their embodied actions coupled 
with computational environments (Kang, 2011: 111). As Kang notes, “embodiment 
serves as an interpretive framework through which computable information and its 
impact on human perception are understood as a continuous, co-constitutive relation 
rather than as separate, independent processes” (2011: 112). Within such a framework, 
affordances would operate as relational, bidirectional, ecological expressions of action, 
in which environment becomes a complex assemblage of potential interactions that 
are co-constitutive of agents and action. 
In distinguishing his post-phenomenological account of human-technology relations 
from both assemblage theory and actor network theory, Ihde (2002) asserts: “There is, 
indeed, a limited set of senses by which the nonhumans are actants, at least in the ways 
in which in interactions with them, humans and situations are transformed and translated” (100). 
Critical to Ihde’s (2002) account, however, is an understanding that this relation is 
neither “innocent” nor “neutral” – and more often than not asymmetrical in 
translation and subsequent transformation (100). As Klinger and Svensson (2018) 
note, even if we are to understand algorithms as “actions,” those performances, of 
course, will still reflect “the norms and processes of media production, distribution, 
and usage, as well as how programmers and users perceive these norms and processes 
that go into the design/programming process” (4658-4659). They note, “to argue that 
algorithms have agency on their own, agency that is independent of human activity … 
occludes the power inscribed in the algorithm as structure” (4667). “Algorithmic 
agency” bears the marks of a mutual incursion prior to the use of any end-user to the 
extent that algorithms, programs, and protocols bear the agency of the programmers 
that script these calculative parameters, but which is likewise distinct from a digital 
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actor’s algorithmic, data-oriented action, which “is less human and more shaped by 
the big/thick/trace data that they filter, sort, weigh, rank and reassemble into some 
sort of outcome” (4659). By focusing on “ideals” and “commercial imperatives” as 
well as “technological affordances,” Klinger and Svennsson call attention to how social 
and economic forces, programmed into these platforms, shape how these embedded 
acts translate elements within a digital environment: an incursion that converts 
“humans actively and intentionally spending time on these communication platforms” 
into “traces that are subsequently (and algorithmically) mined in order to surveil users 
with commercial intent, to target advertisements and so forth” (4662-4663).  
Clearly, on a corporate-designed and commercially supported mobile application such 
as Yelp, for example, dominant consumption-driven ideals and commercial 
imperatives embedded within algorithmic agency exert a powerful influence on how 
human actors engage with the affordances of place. At the same time, the application 
also foregrounds how human agency is critical to digital agency, to the extent that users 
are responsible for creating the database of reviews that the application allows other 
users to access. In this regard, the relationship between data input and data 
manipulation as a programmed form of “place learning” is quite complex. When I 
open the Yelp app, signifiers guide me toward points of interaction, highlighting 
various features that enable its location-aware search functions. A search bar at the top 
of the screen affords input; beneath that, the app affords the potential to respond to a 
prompt by selecting a search category. My engagement with this environment is driven 
by design, by the prompts of data actors aimed at leading me into a set of 
protocologically and ideologically delimited relations with both the device in my hand 
and the lived space in which I find myself embodied and present. If, for example, I 
respond to the prompt to “filter” a search by category, I can “select” amongst several 
signifiers, but it is the application that acts upon the database; hence, it is the device, 
operating on the scripts derived from the application, that is agent in this digital action. 
At the same time, the affordances of place provide the digital agent with a means of 
calling out to users to provide data on their current location, perhaps even at the 
moment they are sitting at a restaurant waiting for their bill. In effect, the digital device 
is constantly acting upon me through both active prompting and passive tracking; as a 
digital agent, it is taking advantage of this double coupling to translate my embodied 
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experience within a physical environment to generate data that can be acted upon 
within a digital environment in a variety of ways, a number of which are captured to 
serve commercial imperatives well beyond the reach of end users. 
 
Figure 2: Yelp screen capture. Yelp, copyright 2019. Photo: Mark Nunes 
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As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun (2016b) notes, “capture systems” operate at an interface 
between data and action: “In a capture system the base unit is an action, or a change 
of state, rather than an entire person” (60). Here, we see how interfaces draw upon the 
human actor as environment, and, in this boundary moment, elicit data, but at the 
same time elicit embodied, habitual activity: “capture systems are all about habitual 
actions. They seek to create new, more optimal habits; they record habitual actions in 
order to change them” (Chun, 2016b: 61). Chun (2016b) develops the degree to which 
habit structures human action: a “productive nonconscious” distinct from any 
conceptualization of a rational-subject-as-sovereign-actor (7). Critical to this argument 
is a notion that habit occurs relationally between an individual and an environment 
that is both social and non-social: habit as habitus (7). For Chun (2016b), habitual action 
is equivalent to inhabiting a set of practices that position users “within” socio-
technological environments. In this regard, her discussion helps to complicate how we 
understand affordances as relational interfaces between agent and environment to the 
extent that “habit is ideology in action” (Chun, 2016b: 9). Yelp, for example, captures 
my action as it prompts me to engage. Regardless of what I am doing with Yelp, I am 
functioning not so much as a data subject, but rather as a set of relations within a data 
environment for a digital agent. As Chun (2016a; 2016b) notes, digital agents act in 
part to transform the actions of individuals into nodes and edges within a set of data 
correlations: a translation from a singular “me” into a correlational “YOU.”  For better 
and for worse, “singularity is fundamentally plural” (Chun 2016a: 378). Chun (2016a) 
argues that “what matters are relations not between things that happen repeatedly or 
successively to one individual, but rather correlations between actions by different 
‘neighbors’ over time and space” (374). If habit is ideology in action, then my 
engagement within a programmed sociality by responding to a prompt amounts to an 
Althusserian “hailing” into a set of relations as both embodied actor and constellation 
of data within material and digital environments (Chun, 2016b: 120-122). 
My smartphone maps territories in which I am constantly reminded that others have 
already been here, be that through restaurant reviews on Yelp, or travel time estimates 
on Google Maps. Our sense of place is always haunted by data, an overlay that is both 
here and not here – data that declares others have been here as well. To play on words, 
mobility offers a kind of digital echo-location. I am located within a territory by the 
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echoes of others who have already come this way. The echoes of others prompt me 
to add my own voice, or the absence of any voice likewise calls on me to input data 
corresponding to my location. In effect, then, Yelp does more than map commercial 
imperatives and the ideals embedded in revealing hidden local gems for tourists and 
travelers: it reconceptualizes my relation to place and locale, and does so by 
transforming the place of information within the spaces of everyday life through my 
dual role as human agent and human extension of a digital agent. In design, the human 
actor operates as source for captured data that is then articulated within data sets and 
represented back to users. Human actors engage in the interface with the 
understanding that their relations are expressed as data acts. The user is not, then, a 
“data subject” to themselves; rather, their production of node identities and edge 
relations through intentional and captured acts allows the user to orient toward a 
becoming-data relationship, much as the social graph allows digital actors to orient 
toward a becoming-human of data. 
Hidden deep within the features of Yelp is “Monocle,” which pushes this 
embeddedness furthest by using augmented reality (AR) features. 8  With Monocle 
activated, my camera now shows me not only what I am seeing through my lens, but 
also waypoints for nearby restaurants and businesses, geo-located and overlaid on my 
screen. The AR features of Yelp, while relatively buried, do bring to the fore this 
moment of double articulation, and the degree to which the device operates as a screen 
of another sort, one placed “between” the digital and the material. “Looking through” 
the screen of my phone, with my phone’s camera as a “monocle” onto a digital world 
that is not directly accessible to me, makes this act of double articulation all the more 
visible. At the same time, the experience of an information overlay is present for users 
even without the AR experience, to the extent that augmented affordances of place 
create for the human user an inhabitable information space in which information 
materializes for human action through the hybrid agency of a digital actor. Rather than 
slipping into a facile critique of how screens and devices take us “out of” the here-and-
now, I would suggest instead we consider how information becomes both habitual and 
inhabitable through our engagement with location-aware devices – information that is 
at the same time engaging the user in human and social interactions within their 
material environment.9  
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Figure 3: PeakFinder screen capture. PeakFinder Ltd., copyright 2019. Photo: Mark Nunes 
 
Figure 4: PeakFinder screen capture, with photo overlay. PeakFinder Ltd., copyright 2019. Photo: Mark Nunes 
While Yelp may bury its Monocle feature deep within its menu structure, other apps 
strongly foreground the ability of the device to allow users to “look through” a now-
materialized lens of information presented on our screens. Farman (2012; 2014) details 
a number of examples of how AR on location-aware devices has been deployed to 
create narrative overlays for walking tours and cultural heritage sites in cities, yet this 
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is equally true for apps that provide information overlays on natural landscapes, such 
as stargazing and trailfinding applications. PeakFinder, for example, is a location-aware 
app that positions users within a topographic map showing the names of mountain 
peaks, the path of the sun from sunrise to sunset, and the user’s current longitude, 
latitude, and compass heading. Unlike a mapping app, PeakFinder assumes that you 
are looking “through” your screen and pointing the mobile device in the direction of 
a peak, hence it only positions you on one side of the screen. PeakFinder bills itself as 
an AR application, although again I would suggest that what it provides, more 
precisely, is augmented affordances by way of the potential actions of a digital agent 
to materialize information. I now have access to a database of geographic and 
cartographic information (the location and elevation of peaks), but I can now also see 
the human written on the landscape (the names of peaks). I experience the affordances 
of place differently in that I now have information (literally) written over a landscape, 
a topography in its most literal sense as a writing of place. The information overlay 
alters not only my orientation toward the landscape; it also provides me with a potential 
set of interactions that I would not otherwise have at my disposal. For example: the 
app shows its user the sun’s path mapped out across the sky, as well as its time and 
location for sunrise and sunset. While Peakfinder defaults to locating me in the here-
and-now, a settings feature allows me to alter the date, revealing to me the changing 
course of the sun – and making visible (for example) the exact two days when the sun 
will rise directly over a particular peak. As such, how I perceive the world offers an 
opportunity to co-perceive myself within a new sense of place, with an altered range 
of current and future action potentials. 
Over a decade ago, I addressed the importance of understanding the “cyberspaces of 
everyday life” as virtual topographies:10 performative speech acts that “write” space 
through material, conceptual, and experiential processes. In a similar move, Ihde 
(2009) describes what he calls a “material hermeneutics” – what is otherwise non-
perceivable is “translated by … instruments into bodily perceivable images,” a 
“technological transformation of a phenomenon into a readable image” (56). Much as 
Ihde (2009) suggests, I am arguing that the boundary operation of a human-device 
coupling offers a “constructed and an intervening process that is deliberate and 
designed [that] brings into presence previously unknown phenomena … by translating 
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what is detected into images that can be seen and read by embodied observers” (61). 
Applications such as PeakFinder reveal the degree to which information can quite 
literally overlay our embodied experience of space and place, reordering our 
topographies to such an extent that we do not merely access information; we now find 
ourselves embedded in it. It strikes me that the point of interaction between embodied 
and digital agents is indeed reciprocal, though not necessarily symmetrical, neutral, or 
innocent (to use Ihde’s terms). It is not just that PeakFinder provides a data overlay; 
rather, one’s physical location equally provides a material overlay for the data mappings 
of a digital agent. My double-orientation toward the device and the place where I find 
myself serves as a doubled point of articulation in the production of space. Users act 
upon a transformed material environment through a range of augmented affordances 
– the product of digital action by digital agents in a digital environment – drawing out 
data that we ourselves provide actively (through responses to prompts) or passively 
(through capture of motion or habitual action) as material extension of digital devices 
through our bodily orientations and dispositions. 
Affordance as a concept provides us with a vocabulary for discussing the relational 
coupling between user and device that is critical to ecological understandings of the 
role and place of media in everyday life. Likewise, it allows us to acknowledge the gap 
between two environments, one digital and the other embodied. As a material being, I 
have no direct coupling with the digital, other than by way of the device. Yet, if we are 
to accept Ihde’s (2009) post-phenomenological “interrelational ontology,” we must 
also acknowledge that “the human experiencer is to be found ontologically related to 
an environment or a world, but the interrelation is such that both are transformed 
within this relationality” (23). This interrelational ontology implies that “there is a co-
constitution of humans and their technologies. Technologies transform our experience 
of our world and our perceptions and interpretations of our world, and we in turn 
become transformed in this process” (44). From the perspective of embodied 
experience, the result is that “our sense of ‘body’ is embodied outward, directionally 
and referentially, and the technology becomes part of our ordinary experience” of the 
environment in which we act and interact (42). So, too, is our sense of place mediated 
through this complex, yet ordinary experience of location-aware mobile devices. 
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As we attempt to understand this complex ecology of interacting agents and 
environments, we are led to consider: what, then, serves as the interface, and for 
whom? Is it the screen on my smartphone, or is it my corporeal presence, smartphone 
in hand and eyes darting back and forth between the device and the world in which I 
find myself? This embodied disposition marks a point of material, conceptual, and 
experiential orientation toward an inhabitable space of information. Cyberspace is 
indeed everywhere; yet it would perhaps be more accurate to note that our mapping 
of place now assumes access to information, a digital overlay that is outside of our 
environmental coupling, but discoverable through our interaction with mobile, digital 
devices. 
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Notes 
1 For a related reading of this cultural shift in computing as eversion, in the context of a discussion of 
the digital humanities, see Jones (2014). See also Farman (2012: 3-12). 
2 As Norman (2013) himself notes, his use of the term “signifier” in this context is quite distinct from 
how the term appears in semiotics (14). 
3 This would be an example of what Norman (2013) calls natural mapping, although effective mapping 
can also arise from arbitrary pairing between action and interaction, as long as the model is both 
discoverable and memorable. See Norman (2013: 22-23). 
4 As Bucher and Helmond (2018) note, Latour himself acknowledges Gibson’s influence in developing 
his understanding of actor networks (16-17; Latour, 2005: 72). 
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5 For discussion of the role of feedback in sustaining conceptual models and mappings, see Norman 
(2013: 23-25). 
6 Karahanna et al. (2018) are by no means the only researchers who have attempted to catalog new 
media affordances, but they provide a useful example, both in how recent their research is, and in 
their attempt to align their taxonomy with the work of other scholars. See Karahanna et al. (2018: 
744-747) for a comparative alignment of their taxonomy with previous attempts to catalog social 
media affordances. 
7  Schrock (2015) identifies “locatability” as a communicative affordance (alongside portability, 
availability and multimediality,) with a direct impact on communicative practices that includes 
“coordination,” “surveillance,” and “locational identity” (1235). 
8 Monocle has always been a “hidden” feature, originally accessible only through a body-enabled “Easter 
egg” unlocked by shaking one’s smartphone three times (Chen, 2009). Yelp introduced Monocle in 
2009, around the same time that Jones (2014) cites a rise in everyday experiences of “mixed reality” 
as well as representations of these experiences in works of literature and film; as such, we may add 
this feature to the list of “a variety of changes in technology and culture [that] converged and 
culminated in a new consensual imagination of the role of the network in relation to the physical and 
social world” that he associates with the eversion of cyberspace (25).  
9 I am by no means alone in making this observation. For a detailed discussion, see Farman (2012: 35-
55). See also, for a more recent contribution to this conversation, J. Didur and L. T. Fan (2018). 
10 For more discussion, see Nunes (2006): 11-19. See also Miller (1995: 3-5) for a more general reading 
of topography as performative speech act. 
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